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Stop Before You Shoot
But Not
Before You Destroy
A Critical Analysis of
the D C. Circuit's Decision
in Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities v. Babbitt
by Tara L. Mueller
0
All fings are t[e works of tie Great Spirit. We should know
that He is within all fings; tie tres, the grasses, the rivers,
the mountains and all tie four-legged animals, and tile
winged peoples.'
Over twenty years after it was enacted, the Endangered
Species Act of 19732 remains perhaps the most significant
piece of environmental legislation ever passed by any
nation.3 At its core, the ESA rejects humankind's traditional
anthropocentnc view in favor of a biocentric philosophy that
puts the needs of other species at least on a par with human
needs. As the United States Supreme Court stated in the
landmark case of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the -plain
intent of Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and
reverse the trend toward species extinction, whateverthe cost.""
In enacting the ESA, "Congress was concerned about the
unknown uses that endangered species might have and about
the unforeseeable place such creatures may have in the chain
of life on this planet."' The ESA therefore affords endan-
gered species protection the "highest of priorities."6
In a direct assault on these goals, the D.C. Circuit has
held that the ESKs protections do not extend to the habitat
upon which endangered and threatened species depend for
their survival. In Sweet Home Chapter of CorAraunities v. Babbitt
the court struck down the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (hereinafter "USFWVS') regulation defining "harm"
(for purposes of the ESAs "take prohibition) to include
habitat destruction and modification.8 This decision strikes
at the heart of the ESA and exemplifies the growing contro-
versy over whether destruction and adverse modification of
habitat can ever "harm" a listed species within the meaning
of the ESKs prohibition against "taking" such species. The
significance of this controversy cannot be overestimated.
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1. loseE Bor.TrScs Pz- Bu=aEv A :rcrmSzvR-.se
oFTHEO A.S:oUX (1953).
2. 16 USC § 1531-44 (1989) (hereinafter'ESA)
3. Tennessee ValleyAuthoityv Hill. 437 US, 153.180 (1973) (hereinafter
"T.V.A vHll',
4 Id at 180. 184 (emphasis added).
5. Id. at 178-79 (emphasis in original)
6. Id. at 185. 194.
7. I E3d I (DC Cir 1993) (hereinafter Sweet Home I).
8. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities v. Babbitt. 17 F3d 1463. r'g en
firx detd. 30 F3d 19D (D C Cir 1974) (hereinafter S,,,eet Home Il}.
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Habitat destruction is the primary cause of species
decline and extinction.9 If such destruction is not
prohibited under the ESA, then this statute, consid-
ered the foremost protector of the nation's priceless
biodiversity, is rendered a wholly ineffective tool for
accomplishing its goal of preserving and recovering
endangered and threatened species.
No doubt in part because the Sweet Home II deci-
sion conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's decisions in the
Palla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources
cases,' 0 which upheld the same regulation, the
United States Supreme Court granted the United
States Solicitor General's petition for a writ of certio-
ran." The case was argued in April and is expected to
be decided by July of 1995 Practitioners on both
sides of the issue are anxiously awaiting the fate of
the Sweet Home II opinion. If the high court upholds
the D.C. Circuit's decision, its opinion will have sig-
nificant adverse nationwide implications for the pro-
tection of endangered and threatened species on
non-federal lands. California hosts more endangered
and threatened species than any other state in the
nation.' 2 It also has one of the highest growth rates
and the highest population of any state." Given
these circumstances, unless species' habitats are
protected under the ESA, we are fighting a losing bat-
tle to protect our state's precious natural heritage.
If upheld on appeal, the Sweet Home i decision
would also significantly reduce incentives for partic-
ipating in habitat conservation planning, which has
been touted as a key means of protecting species
while reducing human-species conflicts. A number
of important multi-jurisdictional and multi-species
habitat conservation plans (hereinafter "HCPs")
have been or are being prepared in California, such
as the kangaroo rat and fringe-toed lizard HCPs in
Riverside County. Even the state's much-heralded
voluntary Natural Communities Conservation
Planning program to protect coastal sage scrub
habitat in southern California 4 would be threat-
ened, for participation in the program is driven pri-
marily by the threat of federal prosecution for habi-
tat destruction under the "take" provision." So, too,
would the viability of a number of local agency habi-
tat conservation planning programs, such as San
Diego County's Multiple Species Conservation Plan
and Multiple Habitat Conservation Program, be
called into question.
This Article briefly summarizes the federal
ESAs key provisions and the Sweet Home 11 decision,
and then provides a point-by-point critique of the
Sweet Home I1 court's reasoning. The Article argues
that the D.C. Circuit's decision should not with-
stand the high court's scrutiny, and that, if it does,
implementation of the ESA will be significantly
impeded. This Article is the first of two parts. Part 11
will analyze the Supreme Court's decision in the
Sweet Home case after it is issued,
I. BASIC OVERVIEW OF THE ESA
The ESA is renowned as one of the strongest
federal environmental laws in existence. Its funda-
mental purpose is to "provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered., .and threat-
ened species depend may be conserved land] to
provide a program for the conservation of such
endangered.. .and threatened species." 6 "Conserve"
and "conservation" in turn are defined as "the use of
all methods and procedures which are necessary to
bring any endangered.. .or threatened species to
the point at which the measures provided by this
chapter are no longer necessary," i.e. to the point of
full recovery. 7
The ESA accomplishes these ambitious goals
9. TVA. v. Hill. 437 U.S. at 179; 1992 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
FISH AND GAME'S ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF CALIFORNIA STATE
LISTED THREATENED AND ENDANGERED ANIMALS AND PLANTS 12-13 (here-
inafter '1992 ANNUAL REPoRT'). Habitat destruction is caused by a
number of factors, including residential, commerical, and industri-
al development, livestock grazing, mining, and timber harvesting;
water and flood control projects; agricultural activities and offroad
vehicle use
10. Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 639
F.2d 495 (9th Cir 1981) (hereinafter 'Paliia I") and Palila v. Hawaii
Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988)
(hereinafter -Palila I1").
11.95 Daily Journal D.AR, 396 (Jan. 10o 1995); 63 U.S.L.W. 3500
(Jan 10, 1995),
12. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT. supra note 9. alifomia hosts over 300
endangered and threatened animals and plants. As of 1987. about
10% of California's native mammals, 17% of its native reptiles and
amphibians, and 27% of native freshwater fish were on the endan-,
gered and threatened lists. JONES & STOKS Assoc., INc., SLIDING
TOWARDS EXTINCTION; THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA'S NATURAL HERTAGE, 1987
(1989). If current trends continue, 33% of California's native mam-
mals, reptiles, and amphibians. 25% of native birds, 40% of native
freshwater fish, and 12% of native plants will be extinct by the end
of the decade. Id.
13. CALIFORNIA RESOURCES AGENCV. CREATING A STATE STRATEGY FORP
HABITAT PROTECTION: THE CALIFORNIA BIODIVERSITY PLAN (1993) In the
1980's. California's population grew at three times the national
average. In January of 1993. the state's population was 315 million
and was estimated to increase to 60 million by the year 2040 Id
14. See CAL FISH & GAIME CODE § 2800 (1989), TARA MUELLER,
GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA ENDANGERED SPECIES LAws 99
(1994).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1989), 58 Fed Reg 65088 (Dec 1993)
(This special rule provides that compliance with California's Natural
Community Conservation Planning Program will not be considered
to be a violation of the ESA's taking prohibition with respect to the
threatened gnatcatcher).
16. 16 U.SC. § 1531(b) (1989)
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (19891,
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through a variety of enforcement mechanisms and
prohibitions, the most important of which are the
"jeopardy" prohibition of section 718 and the "take"
prohibition of section 9.19 This latter prohibition
was the one at issue in Sweet Home 11. Section 9 pro-
vides that it is unlawful for any person, including a
private individual, government agency, or corpora-
tion,21 to "take" a fish or wildlife species listed as
endangered. 'lake" is defined by the ESA as to
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect [an endangered speciesl, or
to attempt to engage in any such conduct.""
By regulation, the USFWS has extended this
"take" prohibition to all species listed as threat-
ened.22 The USFVS and the National Marine
Fisheries Service (hereinafter "NMFS") have also
promulgated a joint regulation elaborating on the
"harm" component of the ESAs "take" prohibition,
which is not defined in the ESA itself. The regula-
tion defines "harm" as "an act which actually kills or
injures wildlife," including "significant habitat modi-
fication or degradation where it actually kills or
injures wildlife by impairing essential behavioral
patterns, including breeding, feeding or shelter-
ing."23 This was the regulation struck down in Sweet
Home 11.24 Section 9 may be enforced by the federal
government or by a private citizen via the ESA's cit-
izen suit provision.2" Remedies include civil and
criminal penalties (for knowing violations) as well
as injunctive relief.26
To mitigate the effects of section 9's absolute
"take" prohibition on private landowners' activities,
in 1982 Congress enacted an amendment to the
ESA which provides an important exception to sec-
tion 9. This amendment, known as the section 10(a)
"incidental take" provision, allows the USFWS to
permit a taking if such taking will be "incidental to,
and not the purpose of" an otherwise lawful activi-
ty.27 To apply for an "incidental take" permit under
section 10(a), a person must prepare an HCP which
specifies, among other things, the steps he or she
18. 16 U.S.C. 4 1536 (1989). This section, among other things.
requires all federal agencies to insure that their actions are neither
likely to ieopardize the continued existence of a listed species nor
likely to adversely modify or destroy any designated critical habitat.
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1989).
20. See 16U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1989) (defining 'person" In part as
"an individual, corporation, partnership, trust or any other private
entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department, instrumentality
of the Federal Government. of any State. municipality, or political
subdivision.of a Stater).
21. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1989).
22. 50 C.R. § 17.3(a) (1991). This regulatl6n was upheld In
Sweet Home I. 1 E3d at 5-8. a holding which was undisturbed by Swat
Home II.
23. 50 C.FR. § 17.3 (1991).
24. It is important to note. however, that the court only explic-
will undertake to "monitor, minimize and mitigate"
the impacts of the anticipated taking, including
conservation of the species' habitat.23 The USFWS
will issue the "incidental take' permit if it finds, inter
alia, that the habitat destruction and associated tak-
ing of species will not appreciably reduce the
species' likelihood of survival and recovery in the
wild.27
II. NINTH CIRCUIT CASE LAW ON THE "TAKE"
PROHIBITION
The USFWS "harm" regulation has been implic-
itly and explicitly upheld in two landmark Ninth
Circuit cases interpreting the "take" prohibition,
Palia I and Palia 1. Plaintiffs in Palia I brought an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the
name of the Palila. an endangered Hawaiian bird
species. They contended that defendant. Hawaii
Department of Land and Natural Resources, was
"taking" the bird in violation of the ESA by main-
taining feral sheep and goat populations on state
lands containing mamane forests, upon which the
Palila depend for breeding, feeding and sheltering.
These sheep and goats ate the shoots and sprouts
of young mamane trees, causing the Palila's habitat
to degenerate progressively. The district court held
that defendant's actions "harmed" the Palila within
the meaning of the USFWS' definition of that term.2
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that
the defendant's actions in maintaining the feral
sheep and goats in the Palilas habitat"harmed" the
species because "it was shown that the Palila was
endangered by the activity."3' The court went on to
note that the "district court's conclusion is consis-
tent with the [ESA'sl legislative history that
Congress was informed that the greatest threat to
endangered species is the destruction of their nat-
ural habitat."-
Palila 11 involved a similar factual scenario. This
itly struck down the USFWS harm regulation. Sweet Home !1. 17 F3d
at 1464 This creates an ambiguity as to the status of the NNMFS
"harrn regulation.
25. 16 US.C § 1540(a). (b). (e). (g) (1939),
26 16 USC § 1540(a), (b), (e) (1939), TVA v Hill. 437 U.S. at
193-95.
27. 16 U.S-C § 1539(al(1l(B) (1939) The term "incidental- is
not defined in the statute or its implementing regulations.
28.16 US,C § 1539ta](2](A) (1939},
29, 16 USC § 15391al(21(B) (1939). This standard is essen-
tially equivalent to the section 7 jeopard'f standard. Sea supra note
18.
3D, Palila v, Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources. 471
F. Supp. 935, 995 (D. Ha,, 1979)
31. Palla 1. 639 F2d at 497,
32. IL at 493 (citing TVA v Hill, 437 US. at 179).
Rcp Ps"Cia ye"i shcot Out 11,31 ?Jorra You Dato'lSprng 1995
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time, the challenge was directed to mouflon sheep,
which, like the feral sheep and goats, were destroy-
ing the mamane forests upon which the Palila
depend for their survival. In the interim, in response
to the Pallia I decision, the USFWS had redefined the
definition of "harm" to stress that habitat modifica-
tion and destruction must result in death or "actual
injury" to a fish or wildlife species to constitute a
"taking" under the ESA.33 In light of this redefinition,
the defendants argued that "a showing of 'actual
injury' requireld] plaintiff to show a present pattern
of decline in the number of Palila."3 4 Because there
was no evidence that the Palila's population was in
decline, defendants contended, the mouflon sheep
could not be "harming" the Palila. Defendants also
argued that the definition only prohibited "present"
as opposed to "potential" harm, and that the sheep
presented only a potential harm to the Palila, since
they ate mamane shoots and sprouts, while the
birds ate seeds and pods.35
The district court rejected both of these argu-
ments. The court stated that it:
refuse[dl to accept.. .and Congress could
not have intended, such a shortsighted and
limited interpretation of "harm." A finding
of "harm" does not require death to indi-
vidual members of the species; nor does it
require a finding that habitat degradation
is presently driving the species further
toward extinction. Habitat destruction that
prevents the recovery of the species by
affecting essential behavioral patterns
causes actual injury to the species and
effects a taking under section 9 of the
[ESAJ. 3 6
The court went on to note that, in enacting the
ESA, Congress was aware that the primary threat to
species was the destruction of habitat. It also
observed that one of the main purposes of the ESA
was to conserve and preserve ecosystems upon
which endangered species depend. Therefore, the
court concluded, "lilt is clear.. .that Congress
intended to prohibit habitat destruction that harms
an endangered species."37 Further, the court said,
since an endangered species is by definition "hover-
ing at or near the critical population mark... It
should not be necessary for a species to dip closer
to extinction before the prohibitions of section 9
come into force."38
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, although
on narrower grounds. Defendants argued in part
that the district court erred in concluding that the
ESA prohibits actions which could potentially (as
opposed to certainly) drive a species to extinction.
In rejecting this argument, the court held that the
district court's interpretation was consistent with
the USFWS' revised definition of "harm."39 Moreover,
the court stated:
[tlhe IUSFWS'l inclusion of habitat
destruction that could result in extinction
follows the plain language of the (ESAI
because it serves the overall purpose of the
Act, which is "to provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend
may be conserved.... "
The [USFWS'I construction of harm is also
consistent with the policy of Congress evi-
denced by the legislative history. For exam-
ple, in the Senate Report on the [ESA]:
"'Take' is defined in.. .the broadest possible
manner to include every conceivable way in
which a person can 'take' or attempt to
'take' any fish or wildlife."4
33. 46 Fed. Reg. 29490, 29492 (198 1) (proposed rule); 46 Fed.
Reg. 54748 (1981) (final rule). As originally promulgated, the
USFWS definition of 'harm' read as follows:
'Harm" in the definition of -take' in the ESAI means an
act or omission which actually injures or kills wildlife,
including acts which annoy it to such an extent as to sig-
nificantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which
include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or
sheltering; significant environmental modification or
degradation which has such effects is included within
the meaning of "harm." 40 Fed. Reg. 44412 (1975).
In an attempt to dispel the notion that habitat modification
alone, without attendant death or injury, was sufficient to constitute
a 'taking," the USFWS amended its 'harm" regulation to the present
wording:
'Harm" in the definition of 'take" in the [ESAI means an
act which actually kills or iniures wildlife. Such act may
include significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns, Including
breeding, feeding or sheltering 6 Fed Reg 54750
(1981).
34. Palla v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 649
F. Supp. 1070. 1075 (D. Haw. 1986),
35. Defendants so argued notwithstanding that even their
own experts had conceded that the mouflon sheep were Irreversibly
degrading the mamane forest and that continued degradation of
the forest could drive the Palila to extinction, Id,
36, Id,
37. Id. at 1076.
38. Id. at 1077.
39. Palla 1I, 852 F.2d at 1108 (citing 16 USC, § 1531(b)
(1989)).
40. Palila II, 852 F2d at 1108.
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Applying the USFVS' definition of "harm" to
the facts of the case, the court upheld the district
court's decision on the ground that the evidence
showed that the activities of the mouflon sheep
could drive the Palila to extinction.4 i In light of this
conclusion, the court expressly did not reach the
question whether "harm includes habitat degrada-
tion that merely retards Ispeciesi recovery."42
The Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed its Palita II
holding, in a' case decided after the Sweet Home II
court rendered its opinion, without even giving
Sweet Home II the benefit of a citation.43 In NWF v.
Burlington Northern, the Ninth Circuit again held that
"the definition of 'harm' in the ESA includes habitat
degradation that could result in extinction."4 4
Plaintiff in Burlington Northent alleged an unlawful
"take" of grizzly bears under section 9 of the ESA.
Plaintiff claimed that accidental corn spills along
defendant's train tracks had harmed and were con-
tinuing to harm the bears by modifying their habi-
tat, thereby adversely affecting their feeding behav-
ior. Plaintiff sought an inlunction to prevent future
corn spills.
Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of an injunction for lack of proof, the
case nevertheless is significant for its reaffirmation
of Palila II. The court acknowledged that habitat
modification could be a taking in circumstances
where a plaintiff can show "significant impairment
of the species' breeding or feeding habits" and sig-
nificant habitat modification and degradation "that
prevents, or possibly, retards, recovery of the species."15 In
fact, the court's statement that habitat modification
sufficient to prevent a species' recovery (not merely
survival) qualifies as a taking, and that mere retarda-
tion of recovery may even be sufficient to be a taking,
appears to expand the Palila II holding.4! 6
Even more recently, in Forest Conservation Council
v. Rosboro Lumber Co., the Ninth Circuit clarified that
the concept of "harm" also prohibits "future injury
to an endangered or threatened species and is
actionable under the ESA-"47 This holding over-
turned a district court decision that "harm" only
41. Palila II, 852 F2d at I II0.
42. id.
43. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burlington Northern R.R. Inc.
23 E3d 1508. 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1994) (hereinafter 'Burlington
Northern').
44. Id. at 1512 (citing Palla II. 852 F.2d at 11I0-I I).
45. Burlington Northern. 23 F.3d at 1513 (citing 50 C.R. § 17.3
(1991)) [emphasis added).
46. Palia II. 852 R2d at I 110. Notwithstanding these explicit
Ninth Circuit holdings, some industry groups are arguing that Sc
Home ii applies nationwide, because the harm regulation was Inval-
idated in its entirety. For example. shortly after the decision in Strt4
Home II, timber industry groups filed a 60,day notice of Intent to sue
to prevent the USRVS from implementing and applying the harm
"includes actions that constitute a past or current
injury to an endangered or threatened species, or
actions that threaten such species with extinction."
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "the ESAs lan-
guage, purpose and structure authorize citizens to
seek an injunction against an imminent threat of
harm to a protected species."
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected
the defendant's argument that the reference to
.actually kills or injures" in the definition of "harm"
requires a plaintiff to show that a challenged action
has caused or is already causing harm to the
species in question. The court explained that:
[tlhe Secretary [of the Interiorl's use of the
term "actually was not intended to fore-
close claims of an imminent threat of
injury to wildlife. Rather. because the
Secretary was concerned that Ithe previ-
ous] definition of "harm" could be read to
mean habitat modification alone, the
Secretary inserted the phrase "actually kills
or injures wildlife' to preclude claims that
only involve habitat modification without
any attendant requirement of death or
injury to protected wildlife....
Nowhere does the re-definition of "harm"
or its explanatory commentary require his-
toric injury to protected wildlife. So long as
some injury to wildlife occurs, either in the
past, present or future, the injury require-
ment of the Secretary's new definition [of
"harm" is] satisfied9
The court further supported this conclusion
based on the purpose and structure of the ESA and
case law interpreting that statute, noting that "'alny
ambiguity in what Congress meant by the term
'harm' is resolved by looking to the underlying pur-
pose of the ESA.-" A conclusion that claims of
imminent threat to a protected species are fore-
closed by the ESA, the court said, would be contrary
to the statute's express purposes to provide a
regulation anywhere in the United States. Sez NM1fe e! an ESA Citizen
Suit oan fie "H n "isrubfn, ftld zai the Dep't of the Interior b7 the
American Forest and Paper Ass'n et at. May 27. 1994. This argu-
ment recently was soundly rejected by a federal district judge in
Washington state. who held that l[tlhe Pairhi case. upholding the
IUSIIS regulation, is the lawz of the Ninth Circuit until and unless
changed by the Supreme Court or by the circuit itself" Seattle
Audubon Socyv. Lyons, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 18736atp. 29 (W.D.
Wash, 1994), sz a Marbled Murrelet v Pacific Lumber Co.. No.
C93-1400. slip op 2 (N D Cal 19;5) (Bechtle. I,
47, _ F3d _ (9th Gr 19;5). 95 Daily Journal DAP.. 3759,
3760 (Mar, 27 i 95) (hereinafter'Rosboro Lumber").
48. 1
49. U at 3761
50. 11
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means to conserve the ecosystems of endangered
and threatened species and to halt and reverse the
trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.5
Moreover, it noted, "lelnvironmental injury, by its
very nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by
money damages," and forcing plaintiffs to wait until
such injury has been sustained would render their
claims moot before they even become ripe. 2
Likewise, the structure of the ESA pointed to the
conclusion that an imminent threat of harm is
enjoinable. It observed that both the ESA's citizen
suit and Attorney General enforcement provisions
authorize suits for injunctive relief, which by defini-
tion seek to prevent prospective harm. Finally, the
court noted, numerous other cases supported its
holding, including Palila I!, which enjoined the
state's actions on the ground that they could dnve the
Palila to extinction, and T.V.A. v. Hill, which enjoined
construction of a dam on the ground that it would
cause an endangered snail to become extinct. 3
III. THE SWEET HOME DECISIONS
In the Sweet Home I case, several lumber compa-
nies, a lumber trade association, and others
brought a facial challenge to certain regulations
promulgated by the USFWS, including the USFWS
regulation defining "harm" for purposes of the ESA~s
"take" prohibition. The district court upheld all of
the regulations.' 4 On appeal, plaintiffs argued that
the "harm" regulation violated the ESA "because the
statute excludes habitat modification from the
types of forbidden actions that qualify as 'takings"
of species."" The D.C. Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, affirming the district court's decision. Chief
Justice Mikva wrote the majority opinion, Justice
Williams concurred, and Justice Sentelle dissented.
The court held, per cunam, that the regulation did
not violate the ESA "by including actions that mod-
ify habitat among prohibited 'takings' "56 The court
similarly rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
"harm" definition was void for vagueness. 7
51. Id. (citing T.VA. v. Hifl; 437 U.S. at 184).
52. Rosboro Lumber. 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 3761 (citing
Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
53. Rosboro Lumber. 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. at 3762.
54. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities v. Lulan, 806 F.
Supp. 279 (D.D.C. 1992) (hereinafter 'Sweet Home v. Lulan"). The
district court held that the *harm" regulation did not violate the
ESA because 'Congress made clear that the definition of 'take' was
to be interpreted 'in the broadest possible manner to include every
conceivable way in which a person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any
fish or wildlife." Id. at 283 (quoting S. Rep. No. 307. 93d Cong., ist
Sess 7 (1973)). The district court also noted that "Iclourts interpret-
ing the 'take' definition have consistently upheld the Secretary's
definition of 'harm' under the ESA." Id. at 284 (quoting Palila I and
On the plaintiffs' petition for rehearing, howev-
er, the D.C. Circuit reversed its earlier decision as to
the "harm" regulation, without the benefit of further
oral argument or briefing." This time, Justice
Williams wrote the majority opinion, Justice
Sentelle concurred, and Chief Justice Mikva dissent-
ed. The court denied the USFWS' petition for
rehearing en banc on August 12, 1994.' 9 In Sweet Home
1I, the court rejected the USFWS' arguments that the
regulation defining "harm" to include habitat
destruction and modification was authorized by the
ESA as enacted in 1973, and that, even if not autho-
rized initially, this definition was explicitly and/or
implicitly ratified by Congress' enactment of the
section 10(a) "incidental take" permit process in
1982. The court held that the "definition of 'harm'
was neither clearly authorized by Congress nor a
,reasonable interpretation' of the statute land] that
no later action of Congress supplied the missing
authority."60
A. The ESA as Enacted in 1973
To reach the above conclusion, the court first
analyzed whether the USFWS' definition of "harm"
was authorized by the ESA as enacted in 1973. It
began its analysis of the 1973 Act with a quotation
from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,6 1 a Fifth
Amendment regulatory takings case. In the Lucas
case, the Supreme Court stated that "the distinction
between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring'
regulations is often in the eye of the beholder."62
This passage was part of the Court's discussion of
the broad "nuisance exception" to the Fifth
Amendment takings doctrine. Before Lucas, which
narrowed the nuisance exception, governmental
entities could prohibit certain uses of private prop-
erty by regulation without compensating the
landowner, provided these uses were deemed to
"harm" the community.63
The D.C. Circuit lifted this "harm-preventing v.
benefit-conferring" concept from the Fifth
Amendment regulatory takings context (as distin-
guished from "take" of listed species) and used it to
Palla II).
55. Sweet Home I, 1 F3d at 3.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 5. As mentioned above, the court also upheld the
USFWS' regulation extending the "take' prohibition to all threat-
ened species. Id. at 8.
58. Sweet Home I1. 17 F3d 1463
59. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities v Babbitt, 30 F3d 190
60. Sweet Home II. 17 F3d at 1464
61. __ U.S. __, i12 S. Ct, 2886 (1992) (hereinafter "Lucas")
62. Id. at 2897.
63. See Lucas v, South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S E 2d
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justify a restrictive reading of the word "harm" in the
ESA. The court noted:
[als a matter of pure linguistic possibility
one can easily recast any withholding of a
benefit as an infliction of harm.... lilt is lin-
guistically possible to read "harm" as refer-
ring to a landowner's withholding of the
benefits of a habitat that is beneficial to a
species. A farmer who harvests crops or
trees on which a species may depend
harms it in the sense of withdrawing a ben-
efit; if the benefit withdrawn be important,
then the IUSFVS'l regulation sweeps up
the farmer's decision.6
In other words, according to the D.C. Circuit,
the very habitat upon which a species depends for
survival is simply a "benefit" conferred upon that
species by a landowner.
Using this play on words to guide its analysis,
the Sweet Home II court next examined the language
and structure of section 9's "take" prohibition to
determine whether the USFVS' interpretation of the
word "harm" was a permissible one. To answer this
question, the majority applied a seldom invoked
principle of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis
(meaning "a word is known by the company it
keeps"). The court held that "the words of the defin-
ition [of 'take'l contemplate the perpetrator's direct
application of force against the animal taken:
'harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap,
capture or collect'"65 Unlike these verbs, the court
stated, habitat modification as a type of "harm"
does not involve direct application of force against
a member of a species, and therefore, the USIIS'
definition of that term gave "unintended breadth" to
section 9.6
The court noted that this restrictive "plain lan-
guage" interpretation of section 9 was supported by
"the implications in terms of.. .private rights"
because "Islpecies dependency [on habitat] may be
very broad."67 For example, it pointed out, as many
as 35 to 42 million acres may be necessary to ensure
survival of the grizzly bear.6 The court also stated
that the structure and history of the ESA supported
its reading of section 9. It observed that the- ESA
directly addresses habitat preservation in only two
ways: through the federal land acquisition program
of section 56" and federal agencies' duty to avoid
adverse modification or destruction of designated
"critical habitat7 under section 7 .7 Thus, the major-
ity stated, "on a specific segment of society, the fed-
eral government, the IESAI imposes very broad bur-
dens, including the avoidance of adverse habitat
modifications; on a broad segment, every person, it
imposes relatively narrow ones."71 The court sup-
ported this conclusion with several ambiguous
comments made by individual legislators during
floor debate on the ESA. 72 Finally, the court said, the
fact that Congress had failed to enact a proposed
definition of 'take" which would have explicitly
included habitat modification was persuasive evi-
dence that Congress did not intend the term "take"
to be construed so broadly.7 Therefore, the D.C.
Circuit concluded, the USFWS' regulation defining
"harm" to include habitat modification was an
impermissible construction of the 1973 ESA.
i. The USFWS "harm" regulation deserves deference
under Chevron
There are several fundamental errors in the
malority's reasoning. First, as Chief Justice Mikva's
dissenting opinion points out, the court inexplica-
bly fails to give the USFWS definition of "harm" the
proper degree of deference required under the doc-
trine of Chievron U.SA tt Natural Resources Defense
CounciP4 and its progeny. The Chevron standard of
review is supposed to govern a court's review of an
agency's construction of a statute that the agency is
charged with implementing. Under Chevron, a court's
first task is to determine whether Congress has
"directly spoken to the precise question at issue.": "If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must
give deference to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress."76
However, if Congress:
895, 900 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1991). oremk4 by Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
64. Sweet Home i, 17 F3d at 1464-65.
65. Id. at 1465.
66. Id. at 1465-66.
67. Id. at 1465.
68. Id.
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1989).
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1989); Sweet Home II. 17 F3d at
1466.
71. Sweet Home II. 17 F.3d at 1466.
72 L Sfz, eg. 119 Conf. Rec 25.669 (luly 24. 1973)
(Statement of Sea Tunnel) ('ltlhrough these land aquisition pro-
visions, we %il be able to conserve habitats necessary to protect
fish and wildlife from further destructionI. 119 Cor, Rec 3E.162
(Sept, 18, 1973) (statement of Rep Sullian) ('[flor the most part.
the principal threat to animals stems from destrucon of their habt-
ta t. _ ITh e ESAI I wM 013S prcf _m Ey 17r7r_ fr L-f; rx,uzriio cf
cricl I,. iitfl (emphasis added)
73. Sveet Home II. 17 F3d at 1467
74 467 US 837 (1934) (herezafter'Cheiwon)
75 Li at 842 (emphasis addedj
76, Li at 842-43
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has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not sim-
ply impose its own construction lofl the
statute.... Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency's answer is based on a permis-
sible construction of the statute....
The power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally creat-
ed... program necessarily requires the for-
mulation of policy and the making of rules
to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress.""
In cases where Congress has implicitly left a
gap for the agency to fill, the court may not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the agency.7 8 Further, it
need not conclude that the agency's construction of
the statute is "the reading the court would have
reached if the question initially had arisen in a judi-
cial proceeding."79 Rather, the court's only role is to
ascertain whether the agency's construction of the
statute is a reasonable one.80
Since Congress did not speak directly to the
definition of "harm" in either the ESA itself or its
legislative history but rather left an implicit gap in
the statute, the USFWS' interpretation of that term
is entitled to deference under the second analytical
step of Chevron. By failing to give the USFWS' defin-
ition any deference, the majority opinion impermis-
sibly placed the burden on the USFWS to justify its
regulation, rather than requiring the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the agency's interpretation was
unreasonable. 81 In fact, contrary to the command of
Chevron, the court goes out of its way to strike down
the USFWS' definition of "harm," relying on specu-
lative and unsupported assumptions and ignoring
clear evidence in support of the regulation's validity.
If the malority had properly applied Chevron, it
would have held that the USFWS' interpretation of
"harm" is a reasonable construction of section 9,
which finds affirmative support in both the ESA itself
and its legislative history. The fundamental purpose
of the ESA is to conserve (i.e., recover82) endangered
and threatened species and the habitat upon which
they depend for survival. 3 For this reason, the ESA
directs the USFWS to consider loss of habitat when
determining whether to list a species in the first
instance.8 This express congressional recognition
of the importance of habitat to species survival and
habitat modification as a major cause of species
endangerment alone supports the USFWS' "harm"
regulation.
The legislative findings in support of the ESA
and the Supreme Court's holding in T.VA. v. Hill pro-
vide further support for the USFWS' interpretation,
demonstrating that Congress intended the ESA's
enforcement provisions, including section 9, to be
construed broadly to effectuate maximum protec-
tion for endangered species and their habitats,8"
Indeed, the Supreme Court in TV.A, v. Hill implicitly
condoned the notion that "harm" includes habitat
modification and degradation.86 The legislative his-
tory of section 9 similarly states that "'Itlake is
77. Sweet Home I, 17 F3d. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415
U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
78. Id. at 844.
79. Id. at 843 n. 11.
80. Id. at 845.
81. In the courts order denying the USFWS" petition for rehearing en
banc in the Sweet Home ii case, the court implied that it had not given
the USFWS "harm" regulation deference because the regulation
failed to satisfy step one" of the Chevron inquiry; that is. the regula-
tion violated a clear congressional directive indicating that 'take'
does not include habitat modification. Sweet Home II, 30 F3d at
193. But this reasoning is unconvincing. No persuasive argument
can be made that the 1973 Congress directly addressed the precise
question whether habitat modification can be a "take, to the con-
trary, it was silent, or at best ambiguous, on the question. Further,
as discussed below, neither does the structure of the statute con-
clusively support the argument that Congress indirectly addressed
the habitat issue by placing the burden of preserving habitat solely
on the federal government.
82. -Conserve" is defined broadly as the "use of all methods
and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered ... or
threatened species to the point at which the measures provided ...
Iby the ESAI are no longer necessary," i.e.. methods necessary to
bring species to the point of full recovery. 16 U.S.C. 4 1532(3) (1989).
83. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1989) ('Itlhe purposes of the chap-
ter are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered ... and threatened species depend may be conserved,
176
landl to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered
.. and threatened species"); Palila ii, 852 F2d at 1108 (the USFWS'
inclusion of habitat destruction that could result In extinction fol-
lows the plain language of the statute because it serves the overall
purpose of the IESAI, which is to 'provide a means whereby the
ecosystems upon which endangered and threatened species
depend may be conserved 1...' 6 U.S.C, § 1531(b) (1989) The defi-
nition serves the overall purpose of the Act").
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(i)(A) (1989).
85. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 153 I(a) (1989) ("various species of fish,
wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct
as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered
by adequate concern and conservation ... landl these species ..
are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and
scientific value to the Nation and its people") (emphasis added);
T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194 (Congress Intended endangered
species protection to be afforded 'the highest of prforlties') (emphasis
added)).
86. T.V.A. v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 152 n,30 ('wle do not understand
how TVA intends to operate Tellico Dam without 'harming' the snail
darter. The Secretary of the Interior has defined the term 'harm' to
mean 'an act or omission which actually inlures or kills wildlife,
including acts which annoy it to such an extent as to significantly
disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which include, but are not
limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering; significant environmental
modification or degradation which has such effects is included within the mean-
ing of 'harm"") (emphasis in original). By this statement, the
Supreme Court recognized the absurdity of failing to Include habl-
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defined in ... the broadest possible manner to
include every conceivable way in which a person can
'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife."1
Additional support for the regulation's reason-
ableness is found in the wording of the regulation
itself. It defines "harm" to include not simply any
kind of habitat modification, but only significant
modifications that actually cause death or injury to a
listed species.M "Kill" is expressly included, and
"injure" is at least implicitly included, in the ES's
definition of "take" 8 Moreover. contrary to the
court's interpretation, the "actual cause" standard
sets a relatively high threshold for establishing that
habitat modification constitutes a prohibited tak-
ing. Several courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have
denied relief under section 9 on the ground that the
challenged activity was not shown to be the actual
cause of death or injury to the species in question.3
Similarly, courts have not been hesitant to deny
injunctive relief when the plaintiff has not shown
that the likelihood of harm is sufficiently imminent
or certain (which is in effect another way of saying
that no actual harm will be caused). 9i
Finally, the fact that Congress was aware of, but
failed to abrogate, the USRVS' definition of "harm"
provides further evidence that this interpretation
comports with congressional intent.92 Given these
facts, it is difficult to conceive how the USFWS' def-
inition of "harm" is anything but reasonable.
Instead of examining the regulation's reason-
ableness in light of these facts, however, the D.C.
Circuit impermissibly substituted its own ludgment
for that of the USFWS as to the advisability of the
agency's policy choice. This is revealed by the
tat destruction and modification within the meaning of 'harm.- See
Michael Field. The Evolution of thle Wildlife Taking ConepT From its
Begin mg To Its Culninaton In the Endangered Spedes Act. 21 Hous, L
,Etv. 457.490 (1984). This absurdity is highlighted by the facts of the
T.VA v. Hill case. in which the parties conceded that the proposed
'dam would eliminate the last remaining habitat of the endangered
snail darter, thereby causing its extinction.
87. S. Re . No. 307. 93d Cong.. Ist Sess. (1973) (emphasis
added).
88. 50 C.ER. § 17.3 (199i); s e also Sweet Home v. Lulan, 806 E
Supp. at 284.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1989).
90. See Pyramid Lake PatuteTribe v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 898
F.2d 1410. 1420 (9th Cir. 1990) (water diversions not shown to cause
harm to endangered fish); American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 9 F3d 163.
166 (Ist Cir. 1993) (lead shots in deer carcasses not shown to cause
harm to endangered bald eagle); Morrill v. Lulan. 802 F, Supp, 424.
432 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (development project not shown to cause harm
to endangered mouse).
91. Burlington Northern. 23 F.3d at 15 11; North Slope Borough
v. Andrus. 486 F. Supp. 332, 362 (D.D.C.), afd in part. re/d In part, 642
F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
92. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599
(1983) (holding that Congress' failure to amend the Internal
majority's focus on the question whether a broad
reading of "take" would lead to an -extinction of pri-
vate nghts," instead of focusing on the real question
at hand; that is. whether the USFWS" interpretation
of "take" is reasonable and furthers the ESAs goals
of preventing the extinction of species." Since a Fifth
Amendment takings claim was not before the court.
the effect of the USFWS' "harm" regulation on pri-
vate rights was irrelevant to the question whether
that regulation is a permissible construction of the
ESA.Y
The D.C. Circuit's misapplication of the Chevron
standard of review is reason enough for the Sweet
Home It opinion to be overruled.
2. Regardless of the proper application of Chevron,
the majority's reasoning is fundamentally flawed
Putting aside the question of Chevron deference
and examining the majoritys reasoning in its own
right, the opinion does not withstand close scrutiny.
In fact it is the court's, not the USFWS'. interpretation
of "harm" which is unreasonable, for the reasons
explained below.0
a. "Take" includes indirect means of
harming a species
First, the court's "plain language" interpretation
of the "take" prohibition and its reliance on noscitur
a sodis is fundamentally flawed. Section 9 cannot
reasonably be interpreted to contemplate only
direct applications of force against a species. As
Chief Justice Mikva points out in his dissenting
opinion, "'harm' is not a single elastic word among
many irondad ones but an ambiguous term sur-
Revenue Code to vitiate certain IRS rulingswas persuasive endence
that Congress intended to acquiesce in the IFS interpretation of
the statute)
93. Sweet Home If. 17 F3d at 1465 (emphasis added).
94- In his opinion dissenting from the majority's denial of
rehearing en farm. justice Silberman raised the question whether
CF.r;rn deference was proper in light of the fact that violations of
section 9 are punishable bycriminal aswell as cil penalties. Sweet
Home 11. 30 F3d at 194- This isue also was raised in the Sweet Home
plaintiffs' opposition to the Solicitor's petition for certioran. See
Respondent's Brief at 20-22. Sweet Home I The criminal enforce-
ment issue is somewhat of a red herring, however There is no rea-
son why a court cannot grve deterence to the civil application of the
"harm regulation under Crvn and construe the same regulation
more narrowly for purposes of an as applied challenge in a criminal
case. Moreover, the standard for proving a violation of the 'harm"
requirement is in fact higher in cnrminal cases and cases where
penalities are being impsed In these circumstances, only "know-
ing violations" of the statute are actionable 16 U SC § 1540(a),(b)
(1989) Further. a threat of imminent harm, while sufficient for pur-
poses of injunctive relief. may be insufficient to support civil or
criminal penalties. Rosboro Lumber. 95 Daily Journal DAR. at 3763
n3,
95 Ironically. these failings in the court's reasoning further
point to the reasonableness of the USFWS' reading of the "harm"
provision.
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rounded by other ambiguous terms," some broad,
some narrow.9 6 Indeed; the majority itself acknowl-
edges that some of the words in the ESA's definition
of "take," such as killing or trapping, may involve the
application of force that is not "instantaneous or
immediate." 97
Moreover, the majority's opinion, that "take"
cannot include indirect means of injuring listed
species, renders the term "harm" superfluous, for all
conceivable direct means of injuring species are
adequately covered by the other terms in the "take"
definition. Thus, despite its apparent affinity for
canons of statutory construction, the majority
seems to have forgotten one of the most well estab-
lished of those canons: that '"a statute should be
interpreted so as not to render one part inopera-
tive' "98 The court's reliance on the doctrine of nosci-
tur a sociis, whereby all terms must be similarly con-
strued, is in conflict with the presumption against
surplusage, under which the same terms must be
given different, rather than synonymous, mean-
ings.9  Therefore, it is unreasonable to interpret
"take" to include only direct means of force, as such
an interpretation causes the term "harm" in effect to
be read out of the statute altogether.
This conclusion finds ample support in the leg-
islative history of the ESA, which indicates that
Congress intended the term "take" to be construed
in the broadest conceivable manner to include
direct as well as indirect applications of force
against a species. °° The House Report on the 1973
ESA states that "harassment" as a form of taking
would "allow, for example, the [USFWSI to regulate
or prohibit the activities of birdwatchers where the
effect of those activities might disturb the birds and
make it difficult for them to hatch or raise their
96, Sweet Home 1i, 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva. C.j., dissenting).
97. Id at 1465 (majority opinion). The majority attempts to
harmonize this concession with the rest of the opinion by reason-
ing that, unlike habitat modification, killing or trapping both
involve some kind of physical force or 'release of energy.' Id. This
attempt fails, however, because the majority does-not explain why
use of a bulldozer to plow over the very habitat upon which a
species depends for survival does not involve physical force or a
.release of energy* similar to shooting a bullet or setting a trap.
98. Mountain States Tel. & Tel v. Pueblo of Santa Aa. 472 U.S.
237, 249 (1985) (quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379. 392
(1979)). Justice Sentelle, on the other hand, does not forget this
canon but rather misapplies it. He notes in his concurring opinion
that 'to define 'harm' as broadly as does the [USFWSI is to render all
other words in the statutory definition of 'taking' superfluous in vio-
lation of the presumption against surplusage." Sweet Home II, 17
F3d at 1472. This statement misses the mark. If the definition of
'harm" is in fact so far removed from actual death or injury to a mem-
ber of a listed species as the malority opines, then this definition can
hardly render the other words in the ESA definition of 'take," such as
death or injury, superfluous, since death and injury would necessar-
ily be a more serious means of interfering with a species' well being.
Furthermore, under the plain language of the USFWS "harm" regula-
tion, someone may 'harm" a species by interfering with breeding,
young."oi Since birdwatching is obviously an indi-
rect means of interfering with a species' well-being,
this is persuasive evidence that Congress did con-
template that "take" would encompass indirect
means of force. 1i2 Therefore, the plain language and
legislative history of the ESA indicate that the
majority's use of noscitur a sociis to adopt a restrictive
reading of section 9 is inappropriate.
b. Habitat modification has a direct, adverse
impact on species
Even assuming arguendo that Congress intend-
ed "take" to encompass only direct applications of
force against a species, the majority's holding nev-
ertheless is an unreasonable interpretation of the
ESA because it misunderstands the adverse nature
of "habitat modification" and its inverse relation-
ship to species survival. Habitat modification nec-
essarily has a direct, unavoidable, adverse impact
on a species. Like killing, such activities attack a
species' very means of existence and survival. In
fact, habitat degradation is the primary way in
which species are driven to extinction, 03 In Palila II,
the Ninth Circuit recognized the directness of the
threat posed by habitat modification. It noted that
"[ilf the 'harassment' form of taking includes activi-
ties so removed from actual injury to la species) as
birdwatching, then the 'harm' form of taking should
include more direct activities" such as habitat modifi-
cation.e 4 In addition, the regulation defining "harm"
itself limits the extent to which habitat modification
will be deemed to "harm" a species to those cir-
cumstances in which direct impacts will result:
"harm" is defined to include "significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or
injures wildlife."os
feeding and sheltering but not necessarily cause death or man fe'st
physical inury to that species 50 C FR § 17 3 (1991)
99. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities,
Petition for Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court filed Nov
10, 1994 (hereinafter 'Petition for Certiorari'), at p 16 n I5
100. S. Rep. No. 307, 93d Cong., Ist Sess (1973)
101. H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93d Cong 1st Sess (1973) (quoted In
Palila II, 852 F.2d at 1108).
102. See Field, supra note 86, at 488
103. See T.VA. v, Hill, 437 U S at 179 ("ltlhe two major causes
of extinction are hunting and destruction of natural habitat' S Rep
No. 93-307. p 2. Of these twin threats, Congress was Informed that
the greatest was destruction of natural habitats"),
104. Palla II, 852 F2d at 1108 (emphasis added)
105. 50 C.FR. § 17.3 (1991) (emphasis added) ironically,
Justice Sentelle's dissenting opinion in Sweet Home I acknowledges
that habitat modification can "harm, a species He stated
I see no reasonable way that the term "take" can be
defined to include 'significant habitat modifica-
tion or degradation' as it is defined in 50 C FR §
173. 1 have in my time seen a great many farmers
modifying habitat. They modify by plowing, by till-
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c. The structure of the ESA and its legislative
history do not support the argument that Congress
intended private parties to bear no habitat conserva-
tion responsibilities under the ESA
Finally, there is nothing in the ESA or its leg-
islative history to support the D.C. Circuit's conclu-
sion that the ESA protects habitat solely through sec-
tion 5's federal land acquisition program and feder-
al agencies' section 7 duty to avoid adverse modifi-
cation or destruction of designated critical habitat.
The fact that two sections of the ESA specifically
address the habitat preservation responsibilities of
the federal government does not necessarily imply
that Congress thereby meant to allow habitat modi-
fication by non-federal entities under section 9.i6
Furthermore, contrary to the D.C. Circuit's con-
clusion, the comments of various legislators, made
during floor debate on the ESA, do not support a
distinction between federal government and private
party responsibilities to conserve habitat. The gen-
eral rule is that '°debates in Congress expressive of
the views and motives of individual members are
not a safe guide.. .in ascertaining the meaning and
purpose of the law making body' "107 More impor-
tantly, the comments cited by the court simply
demonstrate that the speakers had argued that the
federal government should bear some responsibili-
ty for conserving habitat under sections 5 and 7, but
do not demonstrate that private landowners should
not be required to do so under section 9.
Sections 5 and 7 alone are inadequate mecha-
nisms for fully effectuating Congress' intent to pro-
tect endangered and threatened species and their
habitats. With respect to section 5. it is unrealistic
to expect that the ESA's broad species conservation
and recovery goals can be accomplished solely by
preserving existing federal lands. At the same time,
ing. by cleanng. and in a thousand other ways, At
no point when I have seen a farmer so engaged has
it occurred to me that he is taking game.... He may
be doing something harrul to s ldlife. but he is not'tak-
ing" it. Sweet Home 1. 1 E3d at 12 (emphasis added).
106. See. eg.. Sweet Home v. Lulan. 806 . Supp. at 283 ('Itlhe
language and legislative history of § 1534 clearly indicate that
Congress considered land acquisition a critical tool in preserving
habitat, but they do not suggest that Congress intended it to be the
only tool').
107. Sweet Home I. 17 F.3d at 1476 (Mikva. Ci. dissenting)
(quoting Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deenng, 254 U.S. 443. 474
(1921)).
108. For example, the USRVS or NMFS may exclude an area
from a critical habitat designation if it determines that the eco-
nomic and other benefits of excluding the area outweigh the bene-
fits of including it within the designation. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)
(1989).
109. For example, the users need not designate critical habi-
tat if not "prudent" or if such habitat cannot be determined. Sre 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A). 1533(b)(6)(C](ii) (1989). In the latter case.
the USFWS may postpone critical habitat designation for up to one
year after promulgation of the final rule listing the species.
the federal government is financially unable to pur-
chase enough private lands necessary to conserve
listed species. With respect to section 7. the federal
government's duties apply only to formally desgnat-"
ed critical habitat. Large areas of habitat important
to species breeding. feeding, sheltering, and repro-
duction may not be included within this designa-
tionlc3 or critical habitat may not be designated for
a particular species at all.e0 Even formal designa-
tion of critical habitat does not provide an absolute
level of protection for a listed species. Designation
only restricts federal agency actions on those lands,
and even those actions can go forward if an -inci-
dental take" statement is issued' 10
Moreover, interpreting the ESA as imposing
habitat protection duties only on the federal gov-
emnment, but not on private parties, creates an
inconsistency in the Act. Under this interpretation.
a private party who needs a federal permit (such as
a "dredge and fill" permit under section 404 of the
Clean Water Act"') to proceed with a project locat-
ed within an area designated as critical habitat will
be required to conserve habitat through the section
7 consultation process., On the other hand, a party
who need not obtain a federal permit will not be
required to conserve habitat at all. This distinction
makes little sense.
Finally. Congress' failure to enact an expanded
definition of 'take" which would have included habi-
tat modification similarly does not support the
Swete Home 11 court's strained reading of the "take'
prohibition, As Chief justice Mikva notes, there is
no indication in the legislative history as to why
Congress chose one definition of "take" over the
other or that Congress' choice expressly was intend-
ed to exclude habitat modification from that defini-
tion.'I Congress' action just as readily may be con-
Moreover, the USIS is extremely baakMo~ed on designation of
critical habitat, having formally designated critical habitat for only
105 out of 651 listed domestic species (about 16%) US GCr?.
Accowm; OFF=_E;o':~c Sacz= AcrT  -,s A:;a Mwrav oF
l.nv,, ,.: Acrr:wz 28-29 (Ma'y 19?2)
110, 16 US C§ I 536lbI(4) (1939) An incidental take statement
alloss the taking of a certain number of individuals of the species,
proided the continued existence of the species vltiot be leopar-
dized or critical habitat will not be adversely modified or destro'ed
Compliance with the terms of an "ncdental take' statement is not
considered a taking under section 9 16 U S C § 1536(o12 (1939).
For this reason, a broad Interpretation of 'harm' to include habitat
modification does not render federal agenries' section 7 duty to
avold adverse habitat modification superfluous. To the contrary, the
two processes are closely coordinated and do not overlap
111, 33 U SC § 1344 (1939)
112i Sweet Home I1. 17 F3d at 1476 (Mika. C., dissenting see
ab Sweet Home v Lujan. 896 F Supp at 283 ('[tlhere is absolute-
ly nothing in the legislative history of the ESA to indimte that the
Senate rejected the definition [of take] in S 1933 specifically
because it wanted to exclude habitat modification from the defini-
tion of take- In fact, the Senate Report inlicates just the opposite.
that 'take' vas being defined 'in the broadest possible manner').
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strued as a decision to use the general word "harm"
to "cover the entire landscape" of that method of
"taking" a species, as opposed to specifically defin-
ing "harm" to include only habitat modification." 3
Also, the definition of "harm" rejected by Congress
was much broader than the USFWS' current defini-
tion, since the former definition would have made
habitat modification, no matter how slight, a per se
taking.i14 Moreover, inclusion of the word "harm" in
the ESA's definition of "take" was never voted on by
a Committee; rather, the term was added to the def-
inition during the Senate floor debate on the ESA.
This leads to the conclusion that, if anything,
Congress intended to broaden the definition of
"take," not to restrict it."1 Lastly, as explained
below, the majority's emphasis on congressional
failure to act as a reliable indicator of congression-
al intent is curiously inconsistent with a subse-
quent portion of the opinion.
Thus, as demonstrated above, the court's con-
clusion that the USFWS regulation defining "harm" to
include habitat modification is an unreasonable
interpretation of the ESA is unsupported by the plain
language, structure and legislative history of the ESA.
B. 1982 Amendments to the ESA
Having rejected the USFWS' arguments based
on the 1973 ESA, the court next rejected the
agency's alternative argument that the 1982 section
10(a) "incidental take" amendment to the ESA
either explicitly or implicitly ratified the agency's
definition of "harm."
1. Express ratification of habitat modification
In repudiating the express ratification argu-
ment, the court reasoned that enactment of section
10(a) (under which an "incidental take" of a listed
species may be permitted if any adverse effects on
the species are mitigated by an HCP), does not nec-
essarily imply that Congress assumed incidental
takings would include habitat modification. Rather,
the court said, "[hiarms involving the direct appli-
cations of force.. .pose the problem of incidental
takings.... In fact, the key example of the sort of
problem to be corrected by § 10(a)(l)(B) involved
the immediate destruction of animals that would be
trapped by a human enterprise," such as the entrain-
ment or impingement of Sturgeon eggs by a nuclear
power plant intake structure." 6 Moreover, the court
stated, section 10(a)'s focus on "habitat conserva-
tion" implies nothing about the nature of the pro-
hibited taking, since that section simply addresses
the type of relief that must be provided if an otherwise
prohibited taking is allowed to occur."' Thus, the
majority concluded, the implicit assumptions
underlying section 10(a) do not "embrace the idea
that 'take' included any significant habitat modifica-
tion injurious to wildlife."&
Again, there are several basic problems with this
unusually constrained reading of the ESA. First, the
court ignores the very purpose of the section 10(a)
amendment, which was enacted in response to the
USFWS' "harm" regulation and the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Pala 1.19 The HCP process specifically
was designed to provide a means by which private
development projects could proceed notwithstand-
ing their adverse impact on endangered and threat-
ened species and habitat. In fact, Congress modelled
the HCP process directly after a conservation plan
prepared by a housing developer in San Mateo
County, California, who proposed to set aside habi-
tat on San Bruno Mountain for the endangered
Mission blue butterfly in exchange for being allowed
to develop some of that habitat without violating the
ESA's "take" prohibition. The Senate Report on the
section 10(a) amendment states:
iln some cases, the overall effect of a pro-
lect can be beneficial to a species, even
though some incidental taking may occur,
An example is the development of some
3000 dwelling units on the San Bruno
Mountain near San Francisco. The site is
also habitat for three endangered butter-
flies.... The proposed amendment should
lead to resolution of potential conflicts
between endangered species and the
actions of private developers, while at the same
time encouraging these developers to
become more actively involved in the con-
servation of these species.120
Since housing development primarily impacts
species through destruction and adverse modifica-
tion of their habitat, the only reasonable conclusion
to be drawn from the above quoted language and the
section 10(a) amendment to the ESA is that
113. Sweet Home II. 17 F3d at 1476 (Mikva, C.j. dissenting).
114. Id.. Sweet Home v. Luian, 806 F. Supp. at 283.
115. Sweet Home ii, 17 F.3d at 1476 (Mikva. c.I. dissenting).
116, Id. at 1467 (maiority opinion).
117. Id. at 1468-69.
118. Id. at 1468.
119. Robert Thornton. Searching for Predictability Habitat
Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENwvL
L. 605, 621 (1991).
120. S. Rep. No, 97-418, 97th Cong, 2d Sess i0 (1982), quoted
in Friends of Endangered Species v. jantzen, 760 F2d 976, 982-83
(9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
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Congress assumed that "take" includes habitat mod-
ification and destruction.iai This interpretation effec-
tuates both the purpose and the applicability of sec-
tion 10(a). In contrast, the majority's strained inter-
pretation of section 10(a) as limited to those rare cir-
cumstances in which the project at issue involves the
immediate application of force against a species
"trapped by a human enterprise" renders this provi-
sion virtually meaningless. There are few proposed
projects that will result in the 'immediate destruc-
tion" and "entrapment" of listed species in the same
manner as an intake structure for a nuclear power
plant. The opinion thus renders the vast majority of
incidental take" permits, which are almost exclu-
sively prepared for land use development and
resource extraction projects, an exercise in futility.'
2. Implied ratification of habitat modification
Next, the Sweet Home II court dismissed the
USFWS' argument that the 1982 Congress implicitly
had adopted the USFVS' definition of "harm"
because Congress: (1) was aware of that interpreta-
tion but nevertheless chose not to exclude habitat
modification from section 9's definition of 'take"; and
(2) did not enact an amendment that would have
excluded habitat modification from the definition of
"take." The court reasoned that the Supreme Court
has generally refused to infer congressional ratifica-
tion of an agency interpretation of a statute based on
Congress' refusal to amend the statute expressly to
disclaim the offending interpretation.12 3
However, the D.C. Circuit's opinion disregarded
established Supreme Court precedent to the con-
trary. In fact, the court acknowledged that these
precedents exist, but nevertheless failed to distin-
guish them from the Sweet Home II case. Under the
"doctrine of ratification by implication," an agency
interpretation of a statute which "has been 'fully
brought to the attention of the public and the
Congress'- and which Congress "has not sought to
121. See Field, supra note 86, at 502 ('(tlhe San Bruno Plan is
the strongest indication to date that Congress intends the ewpan-
sive view of taking to prevail and that indirect and remote actions
that destroy the ecosystems on which endangered species depend
are to be addressed by the section 9 taking prohibitionsi.'
122. Se MzcHAEL BEAN Er AL,. RECONCIUNG CoNFuCiS UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPEaEs Acr. THE HABrrAT CoNsERvATioq PLANN NrG
EXPERiENCE (1991) (case studies summanzing numerous HCPs pre-
pared for land use development projects). This condusion applies
equally to most -incidental take statements, the section 7 parallel
to section 10(a) "inadental take permits.
123. Sweet Home Ii. 17 E3d at 1469.
124. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell. 456 U.S. 512. 535 (1982)
(quoting United States v. Rutherford. 442 U.S. 544. 554 n.10 (1979)).
125. Contrary to the majority opinion's assertion, there Is sub-
stantial evidence that Congress as a whole, and not simply a con-
gressional subcommittee, was aware of the USV1S' Interpretation
of "harm.' See 1982 House Heanngs at pp. 240, 262. 273, 290-93,
alter ...although it has amended the statute in other
respects," may be persuasive evidence of congres-
sional intent regarding the proper interpretation of
the unamended statutory provision 2 4 Here.
Congress was aware of the USFWS' interpretation of
"harm,"125 and yet did not amend section 9 to
exclude habitat modification and destruction as a
form of "harm" (and in fact rejected a bill which
would have done this explicitly). At the same time,
Congress added the section 10(a) "incidental take"
permit process to the ESA. This is persuasive evi-
dence that Congress intended to affirm the USFWS'
definition of 'harm."12'
It is true, as the Sweet Home I1 majority points
out, that the intent of the enacting Congress gener-
ally should control a court's interpretation of a
statute.1 27 But when the legislative history does not
provide "clear and convincing evidence" of the
enacting Congress' intent, subsequent legislative
history may be used as a guide in ascertaining that
intent." ' Here, the intent of the 1973 Congress is at
least ambiguous on the question whether "harm"
includes habitat modification, if not supportive of
the USFWS' definition of that term.12 For this rea-
son, Congress' actions in 1982 which shed light on
the proper reading of "harm" (i.e. enacting section
10(a), failing to overturn the USFWS" interpretation
of "harm," and refusing to enact a definition of
"harm" that would have excluded habitat modifica-
tion) are persuasive and reliable evidence of con-
gressional intent regarding the scope of the "take"
prohibition.
Furthermore, the Swet Home II court's summary
refusal to give any weight to Congress' failure to
enact a definition of "take" in 1982 that would have
specifically exluded habitat modification is plainly
inconsistent with an earlier portion of the opinion. In
reasoning that the USFWS' definition "harm" was not
clearly authorized by the 1973 Congress, the court
gave great weight to Congress' refusal to enact a pro-
326-29.331 and 343, dted In Petition for Certiorari at n.17 and n.21;
sa &3 Sweet Home v. Lulan, 805 F Supp. at 284.
126 S.u North Haven E& of Educ. v, Bell. 456 US. at 534-35
(finding that subsequent legislative history was persuas i;e ea-
dence of congressional intent. particulrly where Congress refused
to enact a bill thatwould have eliminated the agen. interpretation
at issuevwhile amending the statute in other respects); Swueet Home
v, Lulan. 806 F Supp at 284 ('Itlhe reauthonzation bill that was
ev;entually adopted by Congress did not amend the oginal defini-
tion oftake" to .clude the "ord'harm" or to correct the Secetary's
definition of that term Instend, it amended the pro-sions of the
Section 101a) permit process "to encourage creative partnerships
between the public and prrte sectors..In the interest of species
and habitat conservation-),
127. Oscar Meier & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750.758 (1979).
128 Li. Mlshlre WVestood Assoz v, Atlanti: Richfield Corp..
881 F2d 801, 806 (9th an 1939).
129. Sediscussion supra Section IL
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posed definition of "take" which included the habitat
modification concept. 30 Apparently, the majority
favors reliance on congressional failure to act when
doing so furthers the court's own agenda, but disfa-
vors such reliance when the result is unpalatable.
Thus, the 1982 ESA and its legislative history
fail to support the court's strained construction of
the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Chief Justice Mikva stated in his Sweet Home
II dissent:
there is nothing in the ESA itself, or in its
legislative history, that unambiguously
demonstrates that the term "harm" in the
definition of. "take" does not encompass
habitat modification. Indeed, there is evi-
dence to the contrary. Chevron commands
that [a courti defer to an agency's interpre-
tation of a statue it is entrusted to admin-
ister, unless that interpretation is contrary
to Congress's unambiguous command or
an unreasonable exercise of Congress's
vague or ambiguous delegation. 3'
In its haste to reach a particular result, the Sweet
Home II majority failed to abide by fundamental
rules of statutory construction. But apart from its
questionable legal reasoning, the opinion is likely
to have a disastrous effect on protection of endan-
gered and threatened species. At best, the decision
raises the degree of proof necessary to show that
habitat modification or destruction will result in a
"taking" of a listed species, requiring showing that
habitat modification or destruction will result in
death or manifest physical injury to individual
members of a listed species. At worst, habitat mod-
ification or destruction, no matter how extensive,
may never be a taking under Sweet Home II. Clearly, a
showing that the activity merely impedes or pro-
hibits a species' recovery is not enough under Sweet
Home ii. Whether a showing that a species' popula-
tion is declining is sufficient is unclear.
Regardless of the spin one puts on the deci-
sion, however, developers, mining and timber com-
panies, and other individual entities now are likely
to have little incentive to participate in a biological-
ly sound habitat conservation planning process
under section 10(a).132 In fact, the Sweet Home II opin-
ion is likely to encourage wholesale destruction of
species' habitat by those who assume that their
activities are not prohibited under section 9.133 If
habitat-destroying activities are permitted under
the ESA, the statute is rendered a wholly ineffective
tool for accomplishing Congress' goal of conserving
(i.e., recovenng) endangered and threatened species
and the ecosystems upon which they depend. it is difficult to
believe that Congress could have intended such a
result. As Michael Field so aptly stated:
the expansive view of taking is the only log-
ical approach to use in order to provide any
hope for saving endangered species. By
definition, an endangered species is on the
brink of survival. To purport to place a high
national priority on saving such species
and then not to prohibit actions that
destroy the only habitat in which the
species can survive is the height of
hypocrisy.i34
This is not the end of the story, however, for the
Supreme Court now has an opportunity to set the
record straight. Even if the Court overrules the D.C.
Circuit's decision, though, Congress may enact
amendments codifying Sweet Home I1 when the ESA
is reauthorized later this year. For the sake of our
nation's irreplaceable biodiveristy, we must hope
that such an amendment does not come to pass.
130. Sweet Home 11, 17 E3d at 1467.
131. Id. at 1478 (Mikva, C.I. dissenting).
132. See Appellate Ruling Called a Th reat to Endangered Species Act,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1994, at C6.
133. The opinion may even jeopardize issuance of Incidental
take statements for destruction and adverse modification of critical
habitat under section 7.
134. Field, supra note 86. at 502,
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